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ABSTRACT
Under more and more fiscal scrutiny because of shrinking state and local budgets, workforce
development programs are being asked to estimate their return on investment (ROI). This paper
introduces basic concepts of ROI in workforce development programs. It distinguishes ROIs
estimated for workforce programs from those that are estimated for financial investments or
capital projects. The paper furthermore exposits the basic ingredients of an ROI study—
identification of the treatment and time periods of analysis, identification of the net impacts of
the program, and identification of net costs. Finally, the paper presents results from the
estimation of the ROI for postsecondary career and technical education in the State of
Washington.
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Return on Investment in Workforce Development Programs
INTRODUCTION
The general clamor to rein in government spending at all levels—federal, state, and
local—is causing program administrators to focus on return on investment (ROI). The reason for
this is that, in theory, a prudent investor or a policymaker with fiduciary responsibility for
taxpayer funds should use ROIs to guide investment and budgetary decisions. Their marginal
dollars should be invested in assets or programs that have the greatest ROI. Thus, program
advocates want to be able to show high ROIs in order to maintain or grow their programs.
Exactly what is an ROI? An investment of resources that is made today will yield
benefits that accrue to individuals and society in the future. The ROI is basically a ratio of the
present value of the future benefits net of the present value of the investment cost to the present
value of the cost of the investment. In other words, it is the net benefit of the investment. It can
be expressed as a percentage, a percentage that is annualized, a gross return in dollars-per-dollarinvested, or as a payback period.
Related to the concept of an ROI is the internal rate of return (IRR) of an investment. The
IRR is the rate of interest that equilibrates the returns from an investment to the cost of the
investment. From an investor’s perspective, the IRR represents the maximum interest rate that
the investor would be willing to accept in order to proceed with the investment. Just as with ROI,
an investor prefers larger IRRs. If the returns to the investment and the costs of the investment
have been adjusted for inflation, then the IRR is a real (interest) rate; if not, then it is a nominal
rate.
While the investment theory of trying to maximize ROI is conceptually easy to grasp, the
actual calculations may require many assumptions and “guesstimates” about costs or benefits.
This implies two things. First, since program administrators try to have as high an ROI as
possible, if a “guesstimate” needs to be used in an ROI calculation, and guesstimate no. 1 yields
a higher ROI than guesstimate no. 2, program administrators have an incentive to justify and use
no. 1. That is to say, in many instances, ROI calculations can be strategically gamed. This leads
to the second implication: It will be very difficult to compare the ROIs from different programs
if quite different assumptions are used in their calculations.
Yahoo.com quotes a Web site called Investopedia as follows: 1
Keep in mind that the calculation for return on investment can be modified
to suit the situation—it all depends on what you include as returns and costs. The
term in the broadest sense just attempts to measure the profitability of an
investment and, as such, there is no one “right” calculation.

1

http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20060810101526AAbWeVK (accessed April 23, 2012).

1

This flexibility has a downside, as ROI calculations can be easily
manipulated to suit the user’s purposes, and the result can be expressed in many
different ways. When using this metric, make sure you understand what inputs are
being used.

TYPES OF INVESTMENTS
An investment is a commitment to allocate resources to make a purchase or undertake an
activity with the expectation of getting benefits from the purchase or activity. The costs of an
investment are typically borne before the benefits are received, although both the costs and the
benefits may be flows that occur over time.
There are many types of financial investment, but in general they may be characterized
as an investor using cash (or liquidating an asset) in order to make a loan or buy an asset that is
expected to appreciate in value. The purpose of the investment is to increase directly the wealth
of the investor. The investor’s motive is to be rewarded with loan repayments or ownership of
assets that will appreciate in value. Of course, investments may be risky, and returns may not be
positive. The ROIs for financial investments are typically easy to calculate because the
investments and returns are denominated in dollars.
The present value of a financial investment might be stated as follows:
(1)

PV(I) = R1/(1 + r) + R2/(1 + r)2 + R3/(1 + r)3 + . . . + Rt/(1 + r)t ,
where I = investment made,
Rt = return that is received in period t, and
r = interest rate 2.

Note that, as was discussed above, sometimes the costs of an investment flow into the future—
not just the benefits. In that case, the returns in Equation (1) should be net returns—i.e., benefits
minus costs.
A simple example may help to explicate Equation (1). Suppose an investor lends $1,000
today to a borrower, who promises to repay the investor $600 one year from now and another
$600 two years from now. Furthermore, suppose that the investor could place the money in a
bank deposit that pays 2 percent in interest per year. The present value of this investment would
be $600/(1.02) + $600/(1.02)2 = $1,164.94.
The net present value of an investment I that generates a stream of future net benefits, R,
is simply the present value of R minus I. The usual decision rule that is made about investments
is that an investment is rational if its net present value is greater than or equal to 0. It is irrational
to invest if the net present value is negative, a sign that the payoff does not even result in a
payoff that is as large as the investment. In the above example, the net present value of the
2
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investment is $164.94 (= $1,164.94 − $1,000). The ROI is 16.494 percent. Since the ROI was
earned over a two-year period, one might want to report it as an annual percentage, which in this
case is 7.93 percent. 3
Another type of investment is capital investment. This investment takes the form of a
tangible item, or items, of real property (equipment, land, buildings, infrastructure). The
investments are factors of production, and the wealth motive of the investor is indirect. The
investments are intended to ultimately increase profits or social benefits. The calculation of ROIs
involves estimation of the extent and timing for which the capital will yield financial benefits.
Benefit-cost analysis is appropriate for capital investments to model the timing of the flow of
benefits.
A third type of investment, which may be thought of as a subset of capital investment, is
human capital investment, or workforce development. Individuals, or investors on behalf of
individuals, may invest resources in endeavors intended to increase their human capital—i.e.,
skills and knowledge that are productive in the workforce. The financial payoff for the individual
comes from higher levels of earnings (through employment, hours, or wages), but there are
generally substantial nonfinancial or intangible benefits as well. In many cases, the investors are
not the same as the individual undertaking the human capital–enhancing endeavors. Taxpayers
fund education and many workforce development programs, for example. The ROIs for human
capital investments are complicated by nonfinancial benefits, by the fact that participants and
investors are different audiences, and by the vagaries of the labor market, all of which add
considerable uncertainty to the payoffs.
The notation that is analogous to Equation (1) for a workforce development program that
provides services is as follows:
(2)

PV(SERV) = B1/(1 + d) + B2/(1 + d)2 + B3/(1 + d)3 + . . . + Bt/(1 + d)t ,
where SERV = cost of program services provided to a client (including prorated
administrative costs),
Bt = benefit received by client in period t minus costs incurred in t, and
d = discount rate in time period t 4.

With workforce development program investments, the present value of the future benefits is
discounted to reflect the fact that benefits in the future are not as valuable as payoffs today.

BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
An investment’s ROI is essentially a restatement of the investment’s benefit-cost ratio.
As its name implies, it is the ratio of the present value of the future benefits of an investment to
Let ROIt be an ROI that is earned over a t-year time period. The annual ROI = (1 + ROIt)1/t − 1. In the
example, the annual ROI = 1.164945 − 1 = 0.0793, or 7.93 percent.
4
A generalization of Equation (2) would have variable discount rates, dt.
3
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the present value of the costs of the investment. If the ratio is bigger than 1.0, then the
investment is sound in the sense that it is not losing value. Usually, benefit-cost ratios are stated
in the form of “a dollar invested in an initiative today will return $V in the future.” V equals the
ratio of the value of future benefits to cost.
The essential task of a benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is to measure the benefits and costs of
an action, place weights on each, and arrive at a conclusion as to the net benefits of the action.5
To conduct a BCA, it is necessary to measure the outcome (benefits) and costs in a common unit,
usually dollars. Note that the benefits and costs may differ depending on the decision-making
groups whose interests are affected by the action. In workforce development, three groups should
be considered: 1) the program participants, 2) employers of the program participants, and 3) the
rest of society. The rest of society includes taxpayers.
Table 1 presents the components of a full BCA for a workforce development program.
The final row of the table represents the net benefits to each of the parties and is derived by
summing the columns. The final column of the table represents the total net benefits in society
and is derived by summing across the rows. The entries in the table represent the expected costs
(−) or benefits (+) to the group.
Table 1 Components of a Benefit-Cost Analysis
Benefit or cost
Participants
(1) Program costs
−
(2) Productivity of individuals who
0
are or become employed
(3) Higher earnings
+
(4) Fringe benefits
+
(5) Less unemployment/lower
−
turnover
(6) Lower income maintenance
−
transfers
(7) Higher taxes
−
(8) Net benefits
+

Employers
0/–
+

Rest of society
−
+

All
−
+

−
−
+

0/+
0
+

0/+
0/+
+

0

+

0

0/–
+

+
0/+

0
+

Program costs are in the first row. In most publicly funded workforce development
programs, participation is “free” for individuals. However, it should be recognized that
participants are investing their time and effort, and thus will forego earnings as well as leisure
time while they are undertaking program activities. Thus there is a cost in the “Participants”
column. Furthermore, in some programs, such as community college technical training,
participants may pay tuition or fees for training. Foregone earnings, especially for individuals
with considerable labor market experience such as dislocated workers, may be by far the largest
cost of training. The table suggests that employers may bear some costs of participation. For
example, with apprenticeships they may pay for the classroom training. Alternatively, employers
may enter into on-the-job training contracts (OJTs) that involve supervision or other costs. The
rest of society usually pays the largest share of costs for workforce development programs that
5

Classic literature on the use of benefit-cost analysis to guide social investments includes Gramlich (1981),
Haveman and Margolis (1983), and Ray (1984).
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are publicly funded through taxes. Note in the “Rest of society” column that this group also bears
the cost of displacement, if any, by program participants.
Rows 2–7 of the table represent potential benefits from program participation.
Participation in program services may result in placements. When individuals become employed,
they become productive members of the workforce. Or, if the program participant is an
incumbent worker, then program activities will improve their productivity. In row 2, we show
that employers benefit because they are able to sell more and higher-quality goods and services,
and society benefits from the availability of the additional goods and services. Row 3 shows that
the trained workers are expected to receive higher earnings (probably in the form of increased
wages and hours). 6 Those earnings represent a cost to employers. We have added a potential
benefit for the rest of society in this row because of the multiplier effect that program
participants’ higher earnings may engender.
The fourth row shows that program participants who become employed, or who already
were employed but now have higher earnings, will receive fringe benefits over and above their
earnings. We indicate that the additional fringe benefits may be a net benefit to society, which
assumes that workers value the fringe benefits more than what employers pay for them. This
would be true if workers were risk-averse and employers were risk-neutral. In the fifth row, we
show reduced levels of unemployment and turnover due to program participation. We presume
that—somewhat surprisingly—this is a cost to program participants because they are losing
nonwork or leisure time, plus they may be losing unemployment compensation benefits. The
reductions in unemployment and turnover are a benefit to employers because they will have
lower hiring costs and unemployment compensation payments. It is a benefit to society if lower
levels of general taxes are needed to support unemployed individuals.
The sixth row indicates that participants are likely to receive lower income maintenance
transfers. This is a cost to them, 7 but a gain to the rest of society. On net, the benefit is zero
because these payments are essentially transfers from the rest of society to recipients. With
higher levels of earnings and employment come higher tax liabilities. These are denoted in row
7. Workers and employers will pay higher payroll taxes. The rest of society benefits because
presumably the government will either spend the money on social benefits or cut taxes.
Finally, we would expect net benefits to participants to be positive. Their increased
earnings (net of taxes) will exceed their time and financial costs, if any, and their reduced
transfer income. We would expect the net benefit to employers to be positive. Employers’ costs
for programs are generally quite small, and their return from increased productivity will exceed
their wage and benefit payments. We suggest that the rest of society may have a small net
benefit. This sector of the economy bears the costs of providing a program, and the sector’s
major return will take the form of lower transfer payments and either higher levels of
government spending or lower taxes.

6

For newly employed participants, a full accounting of costs and benefits suggests that the value of leisure
should be netted out of increased compensation.
7
In-kind transfer income may not be valued fully by participants, which implies that such income may
need to be discounted.
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In the empirical implementation of a BCA for a workforce development program, the
main drivers of the results for participants are the “+” in the third row and the “−” in the sixth
row. The higher earnings in the third row result from increases in employment, increases in
hours worked, or increases in wage rates. The costs in terms of lost public assistance are
generally smaller in magnitude than increased earnings, but they may occur if program
participants receive reductions in aid from Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Medicaid, or other programs because
of increases in earnings. The “art” to a BCA and concomitant ROI estimation is the estimation of
these benefits and costs.
Table 1 finesses the concept of time. Generally, the values in the first row—i.e., the costs
of program participation— occur before the benefits represented in rows 2 through 7 are accrued.
In order to add down the columns or across the rows of the table, the costs or benefits need to be
converted to the same time period, which we call the base period of the analysis. Some of the
costs of the program may have occurred in years prior to the base period, and so those costs need
to be inflated. On the other hand, benefits will be derived in future years, so those benefits need
to be discounted to the base period. Particularly important assumptions in the estimation of
benefits (and therefore ROIs) are the length of time over which benefits are received, the
appreciation or depreciation rate of the benefits, and the discount rate applied to future benefits.
Benefits are positively related to the length of time that they are extrapolated into the future, to
higher rates of appreciation (or lower rates of depreciation), and to lower discount rates.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS
One of the purposes of this paper is to identify methods of estimation and key
assumptions made in calculating accurate benefit-cost analyses and therefore ROIs. The main
threats to accuracy are biases that may affect estimates of benefits or costs.
Monetization. Both ROIs and benefit-cost analyses require monetization (i.e., valuation)
of both the benefits and costs of an investment. For a financial investment, this requirement is
not onerous because it is precisely asset value that motivates the investment. However, for
investments in programs such as workforce development, many of the benefits are intangible and
therefore difficult to value. For example, a program may inculcate higher self-esteem in a
participant, which is undoubtedly a benefit, although it would be difficult to place a value on it.
Usually it is benefits that are difficult to value; however, sometimes costs are difficult to
monetize as well. For example, if a workforce development program involves on-the-job
training, there may be a reduction in productivity of the trainer or trainee that is difficult to
measure. Using as a rule of thumb the desire to be as conservative as possible in calculating
ROIs or benefit/cost ratios suggests that nonmonetized benefits should be omitted from
consideration, but every effort should be made to include full costs.
Counterfactual. Perhaps the most important consideration in estimating costs and
benefits is the counterfactual that is assumed. That is, the benefit of an investment is the result of
the investment relative to what would have happened if the investment had not been made. The
latter situation is called the counterfactual. It is never observed, because one cannot
6

simultaneously make the investment and not make the investment. Thus, one has to make an
assumption about what would have happened without the investment—i.e., the counterfactual.
The difference between the benefits that occur after an investment or receipt of program services
and the (unobserved) benefits that would have occurred in the counterfactual situation are called
net benefits.
In program evaluation studies, several alternative methods may be used to estimate net
benefits. Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are generally acknowledged to be the best way to
estimate net benefits. Individuals are randomly assigned to receive a program intervention,
whereas others are randomly denied. Because assignment is random, the individuals who do not
receive the program intervention form an excellent counterfactual for those who do. If a random
assignment experiment is not feasible, however, then an alternative counterfactual must be
found.
Another approach to attributing outcomes to program interventions when random
assignment is not feasible or desirable may be referred to as a quasi-experimental methodology.
Just as in an experiment, the individuals served by the program are referred to as the treatment
group. However, instead of randomly screening out potential participants to form a control
group, quasi-experiments use an alternative source of data to form the control group. For
example, Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) use individuals who encounter the Employment Service
(ES) as a source of comparison observations for a net impact evaluation of workforce
development program participants in Washington State. Statistical matching is used to identify
ES clients who are most like the participants in the workforce development programs. In quasiexperiments, the observations that are used to compare outcomes to the treatment group are
called members of a “comparison group,” instead of “control group.” The methodology is
referred to as quasi-experimental because it is intended to emulate an experiment, with the only
difference being the source of the comparison/control groups.
An evaluation methodology that is somewhat similar to the quasi-experimental evaluation
technique is one in which the participants in a program themselves provide the counterfactual
situation. This is accomplished by using the participants’ experiences prior to their participation
in the program as the source of comparison. This is called a “post- minus pre-” approach, and is
generally considered to be a weak methodology because of its reliance on two very strong
assumptions. The first underlying assumption is that in the absence of the program, the
participants would have experienced an outcome that is equivalent to their preprogram
experience—i.e., the counterfactual is the “pre-” experience. Second, it assumes that
participation in the program is the causal factor for any change in or improvement over the
individual’s prior position. The former assumption is problematic because it biases the
evaluation in a positive direction: Participants usually enroll in a program because their situation
is deleterious. Thus the postprogram experience is likely to be an improvement. The second
assumption—that the program is the causal factor—is problematic because many factors change
over time in addition to program participation. Individuals’ ages, skills, and sociodemographic
characteristics may change as well as the local economy and, thus, the demand side of the labor
market.

7

The justification for randomly assigning a control group using either a quasiexperimental or a “post- minus pre-” approach is that they are techniques that allow for the
identification of a treatment effect. That is, we want to have some statistical certainty that
participation in the workforce development program, and not the characteristics of the
participants, is what caused particular labor market outcomes (which might be positive,
essentially zero, or negative). Another method of identification, if one has the appropriate data, is
to estimate a regression model that includes a dummy variable for being in a program. A linear
regression controls for all of the observable characteristics of the program participants.
Mathematically, such a model would look like the following:
(3)

Yi = a + B′Xi + cTi + ei ,
where Yi = labor market outcome for individual i,
Xi = vector of sociodemographic characteristics of individual i,
Ti = 1 if individual i participates in a program; 0 otherwise,
ei = error term, and
a, B, c = estimated parameters.

The estimated coefficient, c, would be the net impact estimate for this particular outcome
variable.
Extrapolation of benefits. No matter which of the techniques are used to identify the net
impact of a program, a BCA needs to make an assumption about the time period over which
benefits (and costs) may accrue. In many cases, program administrators, funders, or evaluators
will want to examine periods of time that extend beyond the data. In other words, the analysis
will need to extrapolate benefits or costs.
An approach that is often used in BCA is to project benefits and costs for the “average”
participant. For heuristic purposes, assume that the workforce development program at issue is a
training program. Figure 1 (based on Mincer 1974) shows the earnings profiles (in real dollars)
for an average individual in the treatment group and in a comparison group. The darkened linear
profile represents the earnings over time of the typical member of the comparison group. It is
upward-sloping because of an assumption of increased productivity over time. The earnings of
the workforce development program participant follow that profile prior to training, but then
drop when the individual enters the program. The hypothesis used to construct these profiles is
that encountering a workforce development program enhances an individual’s skills and
productivity (thus increasing wage rates) and increases the likelihood of employment. Thus, after
the program participation period, the treatment earnings profile will either immediately or
eventually rise above the control or comparison earnings profile. (Both hourly wage and
employment net impacts are positive.)
The postprogram earnings benefit is the shaded area in the graph. The problem that needs
to be solved in estimating the benefits is how to compute the shaded area. In general, we will
have several quarters of outcome data. In the figure, we have assumed that we have up to 12
quarters (i.e., three years) of outcome data, so we can get accurate estimates of the area up to the
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line denoted D12 (treatment minus comparison difference at the twelfth quarter). Because the
profiles represent the average individual, we use the unconditional net earnings impacts to
calculate these benefits. (They automatically control for employment, hourly-wage, and hoursworked impacts).
What is unknown (and unknowable) is the shape of the earnings profiles into the future
after the D12 point. The profiles could continue to move apart from each other if the training
participants continue to be more and more productive relative to the comparison group member,
or the profiles eventually may converge over time if the training effect depreciates. Alternatively,
the profiles may become parallel to reflect a scenario in which the training participants gain a
permanent advantage, but then their productivity growth eventually matches that of the
comparison group members.

Figure 1 Age-Earnings Profiles of Average Participant and Average Comparison Group
Member
EXAMPLE CALCULATION OF AN ROI 8
The following paragraphs will demonstrate the calculation of an estimate of an IRR and
an ROI for postsecondary career and technical education in the state of Washington.
Postsecondary Job Prep programs represent the applied (nontransfer) training mission of
community and technical colleges in Washington. For the most part, they provide training for
8
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individuals to enter a variety of technical occupations that usually don’t require a baccalaureate
degree. In Washington, these programs are open to all high school graduates or persons over the
age of 18. (Persons under 18 who have not completed high school may be admitted with the
permission of their local school district.) The comparison group pool used in this study consisted
of individuals aged 16 to 60 who registered for the Labor Exchange (the name of the
Employment Service in Washington). Individuals who had participated in postsecondary CTE
were excluded from the comparison sample pool, and then observations were chosen by
statistical matching to be similar to the individuals who had participated in the postsecondary
programs.
Table 2 provides the estimated short-term and longer-term net impacts of the postsecondary Job
Prep programs in Washington State. The elements reported in the table show the increase in
employment defined as having at least $100 in earnings, the increase in the average hourly wage
rate, the increase in hours of employment, the increase in quarterly earnings, and the reduction
(or increase) in the percentage of individuals receiving unemployment insurance benefits, TANF,
Food Stamps, or Medicaid, on average. 9 Note that these results include all participants—those
individuals who completed their education or training and those who left without completing it.
Separate net impact estimates for subgroups of participants, including completers only, are
reported in Hollenbeck and Huang (2006).
Table 2 Short-Terma and Longer-Termb Net Impacts of Postsecondary CTE in Washington
Outcome
Employment (in percentage points)
Average hourly wage
Average quarterly hours
Average quarterly earnings
Receiving unemployment insurance benefits (in percentage points)
Receiving TANF benefits (in percentage points)
Receiving Food Stamp benefits (in percentage points)
Enrolled in Medicaid (in percentage points)

Short-term
9.2
$3.24

Longer-term
6.7
$2.06

71.3
$1,564
−1.2
−0.5
−4.1
−3.0

39.7
$1,008
−2.7
0.6
−0.4
−0.2

NOTE: Dollar figures adjusted for inflation to 2005:Q1. All entries statistically significant at the 0.01 level (two-

tailed test) unless otherwise denoted.
a
Defined as three quarters after exit.
b
Defined as 9–12 quarters after exit.

Table entry not statistically significant.

The estimates in Table 2 suggest that postsecondary CTE has positive employment and
earnings outcomes in both the short term and the longer term, as defined in this study. In the
short run, average wage rates are over $3 per hour higher than the comparison group and
quarterly earnings greater by more than $1,500. In the longer run—shown in the second column
of results—the employment and earnings impacts are still positive and significant, although the
impacts for been attenuated somewhat. This may be explained by the comparison group
“catching up” somewhat between the short term and the longer term. Besides the earnings
9

The earnings and hours impacts are not conditional on individuals having earnings or hours—i.e., the
means include observations with values of zero. Food Stamps was the official name of the federal food assistance
program during our analysis period. The program name has been changed to SNAP.
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impact, the postsecondary CTE participants tend to receive lower levels of government benefits,
especially in the short run.
Earnings. Benefits and costs were projected for the “average” participant. To extrapolate
earnings into the future, regression-adjusted unconditional earnings estimates were calculated for
each of the 12 quarters after postsecondary CTE participants ended their programs. An
exponential depreciation of approximately 1.68 percent per quarter closely fit the estimates. The
initial three quarters of earnings impacts were held constant and equal to the third-quarter
impact. Then earnings for the fourth through the twelfth quarters were interpolated by
depreciating them exponentially at a 1.68 percent rate per quarter. Specifically, the following
equations were used:
(4)

EarnImpact(q) = EarnImpact(q−1) * 0.9832; q = 4, . . . , 12, and
EarnImpact(1) = EarnImpact(2) = EarnImpact(3) = $1,132.

To extrapolate beyond quarter 12, two different approaches were followed. First, the
assumption was made that no further depreciation of the outcome would occur after the twelfth
quarter, and second, it was assumed that the impact would continue to depreciate at 1.68 percent
per quarter throughout the average career. For both extrapolations, it was assumed that
retirement of the average worker would occur at age 65, which was 126 quarters after the
average age of participants at exit: 33.4 years old. Table 3 shows the estimated earnings impact
and the two interpolation/extrapolations of earnings. (Note that the entries in Table 3 are in
discounted 2000 dollars, so they are not quite consistent with the estimates in Table 2). The most
important thing to note about the entries in the table is how much difference the “depreciation of
impact” assumption makes. When earnings impacts are assumed to continue to depreciate until
Table 3 Interpolated and Extrapolated Earnings Impacts for Community and Technical College Job Prep
Participants, by Quarter
Extrapolation no. 1
Extrapolation no. 2
Regression-adjusted
estimate used in c/b
estimate used in c/b
Quarter
estimate
(no depreciation)
(depreciation)
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+10
+11
+12
+13 to retirement

—
—
1,132
1,157
1,068
1,026
869
913
948
995
874
972

1,132
1,132
1,132
1,113
1,094
1,076
1,058
1,040
1,023
1,005
989
972

--

972

Discounted total until age 65

79,239

NOTE: Entries are in 2000$ and are discounted at an annual rate of 3.0 percent.
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1,132
1,132
1,132
1,113
1,094
1,076
1,058
1,040
1,023
1,005
989
972
Depreciated at a rate of
1.71% per year
45,873

retirement, the lifetime discounted earnings benefit is about $46,000 (in 2000 dollars). Assuming
that the earnings impact does not depreciate after three years leads to a discounted lifetime
earnings impact that is almost 80 percent larger—i.e., $79,000 (in 2000 dollars).
Fringe benefits. With additional earnings, workers will also accrue additional fringe
benefits in the form of paid leave, paid insurances, retirement/savings plan contributions, and
other noncash benefits. Two sources of data provided estimates of the ratio of fringe benefits
(defined as paid leave plus paid insurances plus retirement plan contributions plus other) to gross
wages and salaries (including supplemental pay such as overtime). The Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2002) reports this ratio to be 23.3 percent for “All U.S.” and 20.4 percent for the
“West Census Region.” The U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2001) reports a ratio of 24.3 percent
for the Pacific region. Under the assumption that workforce development program participants
are less likely to get fringe benefit coverage than the average worker, and to be conservative in
benefit estimation, the assumption that this ratio would be 20 percent was used (applied to the
discounted annual earnings increments).
Tax payments. Higher earnings will lead to payment of increased payroll, sales/excise,
local, state, and federal income taxes. 10 The increased taxes are a cost to participants and a
benefit to the public. Average (marginal) tax rates were used for each of the taxes and were
applied to the earnings changes. For example, the current rate of 7.65 percent was used to
estimate the future payroll tax liabilities. IRS data for federal income tax rates, which factor in
earned income tax credits, were used, as were state sources for average rates for the other types
of taxes.
Unemployment compensation. Unemployment compensation benefits in the future may
increase for participants if programs increase employment (and therefore the probability of
receiving UI) or increase earnings (and therefore benefits), or they may decrease if programs
decrease the likelihood of unemployment or decrease duration of unemployment spells.
Increased UI benefits in the future would be a discounted benefit to participants and a discounted
cost to the public. These benefits were interpolated and extrapolated using a similar empirical
strategy as that used for earnings. In particular, the unconditional UI benefits were estimated for
the first 12 quarters after exit, and these estimates functioned as the average impact for the
program in those quarters. Then the estimate for the twelfth quarter after exit was used to
extrapolate for 28 more quarters. In other words, it was assumed that the UI benefit gain or loss
would dampen to zero after 10 years.
Income-conditioned transfers. The maintained hypothesis used in the study from which
these results are taken was that participation in the workforce development programs would
decrease the probability of receiving TANF and Food Stamps, as well as the probability of
enrolling in Medicaid. In addition, increased earnings would result in reductions in benefit levels
for TANF and Food Stamps. Finally, if individuals no longer receive TANF or Food Stamps,
they would not receive any support services such as child care or other referrals.
For TANF/Food Stamps, the empirical strategy that was followed was to estimate net
impacts for unconditional TANF benefits and Food Stamp benefits for the 12 quarters after
10

Washington does not have local or state income taxes.
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program exit, and to extrapolate beyond that period using the estimate from the twelfth quarter.
Again it was assumed that, on average, the program participants may receive these benefits (or
lose these benefits) for up to 40 quarters, even though TANF is time-limited to 20 quarters. The
reason for going beyond 20 quarters is that these are averages for the entire program group, and
the dynamics of recipiency were assumed to continue for up to 10 years.
A similar empirical strategy was used for Food Stamps (now called SNAP). Net impacts
for unconditional benefits for the 12 quarters after program exit were estimated and extrapolated
beyond that period using the estimate from the twelfth quarter. Again it was assumed that, on
average, the program participants may receive these benefits (or lose these benefits) for up to 40
quarters.
The state did not make actual benefit/usage information for Medicaid available, so the net
impacts of being enrolled in Medicaid were estimated. The hypothesis was that postsecondary
students will tend to decrease their enrollment rates as they become better attached to the labor
force over time, and will thus lose eligibility. Medicaid enrollment was converted into financial
terms by multiplying the average state share of Medicaid expenditures per quarter times the
average number of household members per case. As with TANF and Food Stamps, this is a
benefit to the participant and a cost to the public. To interpolate and extrapolate the net impact of
a program on Medicaid eligibility, the estimated enrollment net impacts were either averaged or
fit using a linear-equation time series.
Costs. Two types of costs were estimated. The first was foregone earnings, which would
be reduced earnings while the participants were actually engaged in the postsecondary education.
The second type of cost was the actual direct costs of the training.
Foregone earnings represent the difference between what workforce development
program participants would have earned if they had not participated in a program (which is
unobservable) and what they earned while they did participate. The natural estimate for the
former is the earnings of the matched comparison group members during the length of training.
Specifically, Equation (2) was used to estimate mechanistically the foregone earnings. This
equation estimates the mean treatment group earnings during the participation period as the
arithmetic average of mean earnings in the period before program participation and mean
earnings of the comparison group in the first quarter after program participation. Note that
foregone earnings were not discounted, but were calculated in real dollars.
(5)

(

)

Foregone = 0.5 × Eˆ1 + E−1 − E0  × d ,


where E−1 , E0 = average quarterly earnings (unconditional) for treatment group in
quarter –1 and during training period, respectively;
Ê1 = average quarterly earnings in first postexit period for matched
comparison group; and
d
= average training duration.
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The costs of the postsecondary programs for students and for taxpayers were supplied by
the state. Staff members of the State Board of Community Colleges provided average tuition and
state subsidies for Job Prep students and average durations in institutions.
Table 4 provides the benefit-cost estimates for the postsecondary Job Prep programs.
Two time frames are presented: 1) benefits and costs through the first 10 quarters (2.5 years)
after the individual has completed his or her coursework and 2) benefits and costs up to when the
average individual reaches age 65. Notice that the lifetime estimates are presented as a range
reflecting the alternative extrapolation techniques. The table presents the estimates of benefits
and costs for the average participant, and it shows the benefits and costs to the public that are
associated with the average participant. For participants, the benefits include net earnings
changes (earnings plus fringe benefits minus taxes) and transfer income changes (UI benefits
plus TANF plus Food Stamps plus Medicaid). These changes may be positive, indicating that the
additional earnings and transfer income accrue to the participant, or they may be negative if
earnings or transfers are projected to decrease. For the public, benefits include tax receipts plus
reductions in transfer payments. Again, these may be positive (taxes are received and transfers
are reduced), or they may be negative. For participants, the costs are twofold: 1) foregone
earnings during the period of training and 2) tuition and fees, if any. For the public, costs
represent the state subsidy to community college students, on average.
Table 4 Participant and Public Benefits and Costs per Participant in Postsecondary CTE Programs ($)
Benefit/cost
Benefits
Earnings
Fringe benefits
Taxes
Transfers
UI
TANF
Food Stamps
Medicaid
Costs
Foregone earnings
Program costs

First 2.5 years
Participant
Public

Lifetime (until 65)
Participant
Public

10,386
2,077
−1,792

0
0
1,792

79,239–45,873
15,848–9,175
−13,669–−7,913

0
0
13,669–7,913

−2,137
351
107
45

2,137
−351
−107
−45

−2,629
933
331
161

2,629
−933
−331
−161

2,100
3,519

0
6,877

2,100
3,519

0
6,877

NOTE: 2000 dollars. The range of estimates in the Lifetime column derives from the extrapolation assumption. The

larger estimate assumes no depreciation in impact after the third year, whereas the smaller estimate assumes
continued depreciation over the working lifetime.

All of the benefits are expressed as net present values: they are adjusted for inflation and
discounted back to 2000 at a rate of 3.0 percent. Costs are adjusted for inflation, but they are not
discounted.
Return on investment. As noted above, the internal rate of return for the investment in
postsecondary Job Prep is simply the interest rate that equilibrates the (tuition and public
subsidy) costs to the future stream of benefits. The return on investment is the discounted net
benefit expressed as a percentage of the discounted investment costs. Table 5 displays these rates
of return for participants, the public, and society as a whole (adding participants and the public
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together). The costs and benefits come from Table 4. Note that the internal rates of return are
quarterly interest rates; they can be multiplied by 4.0 to get approximate annual rates. The ROIs
are annual rates. It is interesting to note that even though the levels of lifetime benefits change
quite dramatically depending on whether or not the earnings effects are depreciated after the
third year, the internal rates of return and ROIs do not change too much. The calculations are
dominated by the returns early in the average worker’s lifetime, not by returns over the long run.
The benefits and costs in Table 5 are simply summations of the data presented in Table 4.
For example, summing the benefits and the costs in the first column of numbers in Table 4 yields
totals of $9,037 and $5,619, which are the first entries in Table 5. The ROI over the first 2.5
years for the participant is 60.83 percent [= (9,037 − 5,619) / 5,619]. The annualized ROI is the
rate of return that equals 60.83 percent when it is compounded for 2.5 years. As noted in the
table, that rate is 20.93 percent.
Table 5 Benefits, Costs, and Rates of Return for Washington’s Postsecondary CTE Programs over the First
2.5 Years and Lifetime for the Average Participant
Time frame
Benefit/cost
First 2.5 years
Lifetime (age 65)
Participant
Benefits ($)
9,037
46,107–81,404
Costs ($)
5,619
5,619
IRR (quarterly real rate)
9.48%
15.65%–15.95%
ROI (annualized rate)
20.93%
6.91%–8.86%
Public
Benefits ($)
3,434
8,978–14,904
Costs ($)
6,877
6,877
IRR (quarterly real rate)
−14.81%
1.94%–3.08%
ROI (annualized rate)
−24.32%
0.85%–2.49%
Society
Benefits ($)
12,471
55,084–96,308
Costs ($)
12,496
12,496
IRR (quarterly real rate)
0.69%
9.53%–10.06%
ROI (annualized rate)
−0.11%
4.82%–6.70%
NOTE: Table entries are for average participant. Benefits include earnings, fringe benefits, and income-related

transfer payments. Costs include tuition and fees (if any), foregone earnings, and public program costs per
participant. Dollar figures are in real 2000$.

In general, the participants in these programs reap substantial returns. For those
participants, there are tuition costs and foregone earnings, but the economic payoffs, even in the
short term, more than offset these costs. The public, on the other hand, subsidizes the average
Job Prep student by about $6,900 and does not receive enough in increased taxes or reduced
transfer payments in the first 2.5 years to get a positive return. However, the public does get
positive returns over the participant’s lifetime. Society gets very high returns from postsecondary
CTE in the long run.
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CONCLUSION
Calculating ROIs for workforce development programs requires considerable data and
careful analyses of benefits and costs. We believe that it is folly to think that a simple, one-sizefits-all tool can be developed that can estimate a program’s ROI with minimal data inputs and
with quick turnaround. Even though the data and analytical burdens are great, we believe that
analyses of ROIs (or, equivalently, of benefits and costs) are a tool that administrators should use
to monitor their program’s performance. 11
If a workforce development administrative agency is large enough so that a reasonable
sample size can support the analysis, and if it has the resources, it is entirely feasible for an
agency to conduct a benefit-cost analysis. It is likely that a program’s ROI is relatively stable, so
that such an exercise probably need not be done frequently. For that reason, and for reasons of
scale, it may make sense for an individual agency to join a consortium of agencies, or for a state
to provide resources to conduct analyses for all agencies in the state or for individual agencies.
The ROI estimates should be seen as diagnostic tools for individual areas and should not be used
for accountability. If an administrator had evaluation resources available, then he or she should
conduct sensitivity analyses to see what aspects of the agency’s operations seem to provide the
highest returns.
If program administrators are going to conduct ROI analyses, either as a single entity or
as part of a consortium, they need to collect the following data items in order to be able to
calculate reasonable ROI—i.e., benefit-cost—estimates:
►For each participant in a cohort of program participants (e.g., all applicants in a given time
period, or all exiters in a given time period):
•

Application date (or first date of service)

•

Demographic characteristics (age, education, sex, marital status, disability status, veteran
status, public assistance status, etc.)

•

Preprogram labor market experience (earnings, work experience, employment and
unemployment spells, turnover, and industry, for at least three years)

•

Exit date

•

Postprogram labor market experience (earnings, work experience, employment and
unemployment spells, turnover, industry, and benefits, for at least three years)

•

Postprogram participation in public assistance or unemployment compensation

►For the entire cohort:
•

Program expenditures for services

•

Prorated share of overhead and administrative costs for the entire cohort
11

We do not think that ROIs or benefit-cost ratios should be used to compare programs, however, because
of the arguments made at the outset of this paper—mainly, that there are too many assumptions that go into such
calculations, thus making these statistics easy to game.
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►For each participant in a cohort of individuals who will serve as a comparison group for the
program participants (e.g., all ES applicants in a given time period, or a randomly assigned
control group):
•

Application date (or first date of service)

•

Demographic characteristics (age, education, sex, marital status, disability status, veteran
status, public assistance status, etc.)

•

Preprogram labor market experience (earnings, work experience, employment and
unemployment spells, turnover, and industry, for at least three years)

•

Exit date

•

Postprogram labor market experience (earnings, work experience, employment and
unemployment spells, turnover, industry, and benefits, for at least three years)

•

Postprogram participation in public assistance or unemployment compensation

This list represents a considerable data collection burden. The bottom line is that
conducting a benefit-cost analysis has benefits and costs itself. The benefits include learning
about what aspects of one’s program seem to have the greatest returns to customers and having
evidence for program funders, such as legislators, about the positive impact of a program. The
costs include the resources necessary to conduct the analyses. There also must be a recognition
that, in workforce development, it is often the case that many benefits received by clients are
intangible and not easily monetized and that activities that are instrumental in effective
programming, such as analyzing labor market information, may not lead directly to benefits. We
would advise program administrators to weigh these costs and benefits carefully before
investing.
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